Back in the days when Harris-Eve Progressive Conservatives roamed the land, plans were put in motion to sell Ontario Hydro. From a political standpoint the concept had all the earmarks of a deft political move. The Tories had created the public utility back in the days when no private entity could be enticed to step into the breach, and for generations Ontario Hydro provided the province with cheap energy, helping to catapult Ontario into the role of Canada’s industrial heartland.

But after years of energy policies that were enacted for more political expediency than for sound business reasons, a burgeoning demand curve that had by then exceeded the available hydro-electric generation in the province, and the related decision to bet the province’s energy future on nuclear power (and some monumental cost overruns on the same), serious strains were beginning to assail the utility—and the future prognosis appeared (especially from a political fallout standpoint) anything but bright.

In splitting Ontario Hydro into three entities, with one holding the outstanding debt, the plan was designed to create a more salable product, something that would attract private-public partnership that was all the rage in the political mantras of the day.

When the Eves’ government took the obvious next step of deregulating electricity prices in the province, all proverbial heck broke loose in a political sense as rates began to skyrocket. Faced with a public outcry that would seem quite familiar today, the Progressive Conservatives made a desperate attempt to get the toothpaste back in the tube by freezing rates. But the costs associated with creating that power just kept on piling on the red ink.

Fast forward through a number of regime changes at Queen’s Park and the energy file is still a major political albatross to the party in power—in fact never moreso—and the desire to rid themselves of this troubling portfolio has taken ascendancy, especially now that it seems a route to offsetting the cost of making desperately needed improvements in the province’s too long neglected infrastructure. Rather than fixing the problems of the old jalopy, Premier Kathleen Wynne has elected to turn it into what was once a golden goose into a cash cow ready for the slaughter.

This short-sighted decision will come home to roost, first at the polls for the governing Liberals, but more importantly later down the road, when profits must also be harvested from a utility whose geographical and infrastructure challenges are already swamping small businesses and impoverished households.

There are those who may cry that “it’s too late,” with 30 percent of the utility already sold and another 30 percent heading onto the auction block—but it is never too late to turn your back on a bad idea. It will now cost more, perhaps, in the short run, but the cost of not turning that ship around will be felt for generations to come.

Politicians are sensitive to the public’s will, mostly at election time it may be true, but if the pressure is strong enough, every party can be made to change its mind. When the NDP and the Progressive Conservative parties voice their outrage at the Wynne government’s handling of the energy file, they must be held to account to bring their own vision of how they will reverse the Liberal decision to sell off Hydro One before the people and not be allowed to shunt aside the issue with Trumpian platitudes.

Selling off Hydro One is akin to killing the golden goose and once its feathers and meat have been consumed by the voracious appetite of government spending eyes, will begin to linger on a bird of different feather. The LCBO has generated a steady profit for Ontario’s coffers since its inception, running to the many billions of dollars, it too will prove to be a tempting a target once the last of Hydro One’s golden eggs have hatched.